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Casenotes and Comments
w"
MARYLAND STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS OF
THE COMMON LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
By B. H. HARTOGENSiS*
Present land titles in Maryland, as now owned by or
vested in persons, natural or artificial, have an interesting
and deeply significant historical background. Their origin
dates from the granting of the Royal Charter of Terra
Mariae by Charles I to Cecilius Calvert on June 20, 1632,
and from the dominion claimed thereunder. This claim
of dominion, born of discovery and consummated by actual
possession, has been recognized by the Courts of the United
States. Whatever title present landowners possess is de-
rived solely through this grant, and nothing more. This
negatives any notion of title accruing through grants of the
Indian tribes.1 At the date of the founding of the Pala-
tinate, there were several forms of tenure in effect in
England, the principal being that of military tenure (though
it must be conceded that at this date in the history of Eng-
lish feudal law, military tenure did not occupy the position
of honor and greatness which it once held). The charter
granted to Calvert did not contain anything relating to the
establishment of military tenure in the Colony. The grant
was in "free and common socage '' (agricultural tenure)
and the tenure designed by Calvert was agricultural, with
a blending of the lesser forms of tenure in effect in Eng-
land, such as villein socage and copyhold, in order to take
care of the Indians of the Colony.' The grant to Calvert
was thus an abridgement of the basic principle of feudal
tenure in the lack of the requirement of military tenure.
This anticipated the abolition of the various military ten-
ures by Parliament during the reign of Charles II." It is
interesting to note that the grant to Calvert exempted the
Colony from the operation of the Statute of Quia Emptores5
* Of the Baltimore City bar; A.B., 1886, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1893, University of Maryland; Chairman, Land Laws Commission of
Maryland.
1 Johnson's and Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 5 L. Ed. 681
(1822).
2 Royal Charter of Maryland, Art. V. The form of tenure grantod in
the charter is aptly explained in the leading case of Matthews v. Ward, 10
G. & J. 443 (1839).
a Kilty, Landholder's Assistant, 24. Copyholds were expressly ended by
the British Estates Act of 1925.
' 12 Car. II, Ch. 24; Reeves, Real Property, Vol. 1, 357.
a 18 Edw. I, Ch. 1.
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which had abolished sub-infeudation' While it hias been
claimed that this statute was in effect in the Colony, and
even in the State today, this contention does not seem to
have much substantiation. It would seem that since the
statute is not mentioned in Chancellor Kilty's reports, nor
in Alexander's British Statutes, nor in the leading Mary-
land case of Matthews v. Ward7 it was not and never did
become part of the law of the Colony or the State.8 It
seems safe to say that most of the incidents of the feudal
system of tenure were in effect in the Colony with the ex-
ceptions of the Statute of Quia Emptores, military tenure
and frankalmoyn tenure. The Colony also possessed the
land law developed by the Courts of England up to this time
in respect to the feudal system of tenure and its outcrop-
pings.
Upon the advent of the Revolution and the incorporation
of the Colony into one of the original thirteen states, certain
changes begin to appear in the land law of the State. The
first change seems to be made in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of 1776 where it was declared that all of the
property derived from and under the Royal Charter was
vested in the inhabitants of the State of Maryland.' At the
time of the Declaration of Independence most of the lands
within the State of Maryland had been granted by the sev-
eral Lords Proprietaries to individuals or corporations by
deeds which vested them with full p owers of ownership; and
except where confiscated for disloyalty, none of these rights
were affected by the establishment of the new government
and the change of sovereignty thereby. Those lands which
had not been granted away by the Lord Proprietary, to-
gether with the confiscated lands, became the property of
the new state.'" The Common Law of England was quite
promptly adopted by the new state of Maryland, the Bill of
Rights to the first constitution stating that " . . . the in-
habitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of
England and trials by jury according to the course of that
law and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as ex-
isted on July 4, 1776, and which by experience have been
6 Royal Charter of Maryland, Art. XVIII. Venable, Syllabus on Real
Property (1912) finds that the statute does not seem to be in force in Mary-
land. Compare Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 336 (Pa. 1836).
T Supra, note 2.
8 ilty, Landholder's Assistant, 28.
O Constitution of 1776, Bill of Rights, Art. III. This is now Constitution
of 1867, Declaration of Rights, Art. V.10 Morriss v. U. S., 174 U. S. 196, 230, 43 L. Ed. 946, 19 S. Ct. 649 (1899).
Md. Constitution of 1867, Declaration of Rights, Art. V. See Confiscated
Lands, Md. Code of Public General Laws of 1852, Art. V.
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found applicable to their local and other circumstances and
have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of
Lawand Equity.""
With the common law of England declared to be part of
the law of this state, and with the English statutes in effect
in England prior to the Revolution (insofar as they had
been found to be of aid and assistance) declared to be a part
of the law of the State, the purpose of this comment is
briefly to summarize the important statutory changes that
have been made by legislative enactments since then.
Accretion. Accretions to land bounding both on navi-
gable and non-navigable waters vest in the proprietor of
the. land so bounding under a statute of 1862.12
Acknowledgment. Acknowledgment is now required in
a deed conveying any estate of inheritance or freehold, or
any declaration or limitation of use, or any estate above
seven years.18 Although at one time such acknowledg-
ments had to be taken before two justices of the peace, since
1856 one is sufficient,1 and, since 1896, a notary public is
competent to take such acknowledgments." It is interest-
ing to note that acknowledgments may also be had before a
judge either of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, one
of the Circuit Courts of the Counties, or of the Orphans'
Courts, sitting in and for the county or city where the land
lies."6
Advancement and Hotchpot. These were created early
in the history of this State, but being in derogation of the
common law, were strictly construed."7 They are now non-
existent,18 except that advancements, if shown to have been
made, must be considered in the auditor's account, which is
not to consider the claims of a widow, but such account is
only to include advancements to children, except for mainte-
nance and education. It is to be noted that this section
applies only to cases of intestacy. The right accruing to
the heirs that the estate advanced should be brought into
hotchpot is a legal right, and it cannot be defeated by any
alienation or incumbrance placed thereon by the heir.19
21 Supra, note 9.
is Md. Code, Art. 54, Sec. 46.
1 3 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 1.
14 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 2.
15 Ibid.
2'6 bid.
"7 Clark v. Wilson, 27 Md. 703 (1867).1 8 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 180.
19 Young's Estate, 3 Md. Ch. 461 (1851) ; Smith, et al. v. Donnelly, 9 Gill.
84 (1850).
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Adverse Possession. Originally it was held that in
order to procure benefits from the possession of land, it
had to be fenced in, and this requirement applied even to
land held by a trespasser thereon. This rigid condition
was changed in 1852 so that now no actual enclosure is nec-
essary.2 ° A species of adverse possession is the failure
of a landlord to demand rent for twenty consecutive years.
Such failure to demand rent, unless the landlord is under
a legal disability to assert his title, works a forfeiture of
the right to claim rent and creates a fee simple title in the
tenant.2'
Aliens. The common law restrictions on the right of
aliens to hold property, and to inherit and devise same,
have been greatly lifted. Since 1874 there seems to be
little or no distinction between an alien and a citizen of the
State of Maryland in the matter of holding property.
Confiscated, Vacant and Esoheated Lands. Persons
claiming to be entitled to lands held by the Lord Proprietor
in the name of the British Crown, which lands were con-
fiscated by the State,"a may obtain title thereto upon satis-
factory proof submitted to the Commissioner of the Land
Office who will issue a patent therefor." Likewise, title to
any vacant lands and any lands which may have escheated
to the State may be taken by any person making proper
application therefor and furnishing satisfactory proof.24
It is to be noted, however, that under an act of 1818 patents
to such lands can have no effect if possession of the lands
has been taken by anyone for a period of 20 years prior to
the issuance of such patent.25
Contingent Remainders. Any contingent remainder
arising under any deed, will or other instrument executed
after July 1, 1929, shall be capable of taking effect notwith-
standing the determination, by forfeiture, surrender, mer-
ger, or otherwise, of any preceding estate of freehold, in
the same manner in all respects as if such determination
had not happened; and it shall not be necessary to appoint
10 Md. Code, Art. 75, Sec. 84; Warner v. Hardy, 6 Md. 539 (1854).
"1 Md. Code, Art. 53, Sec. 27; Safe Deposit Co. v. Marburg, 110 Md. 410,
72 Atl. 839 (1909).
" Md. Code, Art. 3, Sec. 1.
99a The right to these confiscated lands was given its imprimatur by
Smith v. Maryland, 6 Cranch 286, 3 L. Ed. 225 (1810).
28 Md. Code, Art. 54, Sec. 19.
9, Md. Code, Art. 54, Sec. 25. Patents to lands at the contested divisional
line between Maryland and Pennsylvania may be obtained from the proper
authorities of this State, Md. Code, Art. 54, Sec. 45.
25 Md. Code, Art. 57, Sec. 10.
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trustees to support such contingent remainders in order to
prevent the destruction thereof.2 6
Corporations. Today, corporations duly chartered can
acquire by purchase, or in any other manner, realty and
personalty, and likewise dispose of the same." However
it must be remembered that religious corporations can hold
land and acquire the same only with the consent of the
Legislature, which consent can be given either prior or sub-
sequent to the acquisition.28
Dedication. Conveyances of land, or gifts thereof,
bounding on any street or highway shall be construed to
pass to the donee or grantee thereof, all the right, title and
interest of the grantor or donor of said land, to the center
of the street or highway on which the same is located or
binding, provided always that the grantor or donor can, by
express provision, reserve unto himself his interest in the
said street or highway.29 For a long time there was no
statutory dedication in Maryland. Since 1908, however,
statutory provision has been made for the dedication of
public highways to the use of the municipality of Balti-
more.
30
Descent. The common law canons regarding the de-
scent of real property have been for the most part abol-
ished in this State. Since 1916 real property descends in
accordance with the rules of descent relating to the distri-
bution of personal property of intestates,31 so that lineal
ascent is now recognized under certain conditions." An-
other modification of the common law canons of descent was
the abolition of primogeniture in 1786 so that all those in
the same degree of relationship, whether male or female,
share equally.3 Still another inroad was made on the rigid
common law rules of descent when the onerous distinction
between the whole blood and the half was declared inopera-
tive in 1798."4 But though there has been an appreciable
diminution of these canons of descent, there is a survival
existing in the provision of 1831 that where a trustee in fee
tail or in fee simple shall be seised of the naked title to any
26 Md. Code Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 305-B.
97 Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 9 (6).
08 Constitution of 1867, Declaration of Rights, Art. 38.
20 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 98.
30 Charter and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, Sees. 840A, C.
81 Md. Code, Art. 46, Sec. 1.
"2Md. Code, Art. 93, Secs. 131-136. For an interesting discussion of the
law of descent prior to the enactment of these statutes, see Chirac v.
Reinacker, 2 Pet. 612, 7 L. Ed. 538 (1829).
28 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 129.
$'Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 135.
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land or inheritance, without having or being entitled to any
beneficial interest or estate therein, then if such trustee
shall die, the legal estate shall descend to such persons as
would have become heirs of such trustee under the common
law. 5
Today, fee tail estates, whether general or special, de-
scend in fee simple to the same persons as would take a fee
simple. 6 And in spite of apparently contradictory statu-
tory provisions, it would seem that the same incidents at-
tach to the devisability of such estates. Article 93, Section
328, (passed in 1798) which excepts fees tail from the list
of devisable estates, has been construed, as originally en-
acted, to have reference only to fees tail special 7 since fees
tail general were in effect abolished and made devisable in
fee simple by the Act to Direct Descents.8 It certainly
would seem that if fees tail special can descend in fee simple
as they now do in cases of intestacy, they can be so de-
vised.
Die Without Issue. The inclusion of the words "die
without issue" either in testamentary dispositions or in
conveyances inter vivos has, since 1862, the effect of mean-
ing a definite failure of issue at death, rather than an in-
definite failure of issue."
Distraint. Distraint is much the same as at common
law. Today however, there are liberal exemptions in favor
of the property of strangers, and chattels personal or real,
which are covered by a validly recorded chattel mortgage
or conditional contract of sale.4"
Dower. Curtesy has been abolished in this state so that
a surviving husband's interest in the property of his wife
is now the same as her dower interest in property held by
him during marriage. 1 The wife now has dower in the
equitable estates of her husband. 2 Since 1872 when a
spouse is either absent seven years or adjudicated non com-
pos mentis the other may convey property acquired after
such adjudication has occurred or the absence had begun, as
if unmarried. 2a
as Md. Code, Art. 46, Sec. 5. Latrobe v. Carter, 83 Md. 279, 34 AtI: 472
(1896).
16 Md. Code, Art. 46. Sec. 1.
"Posey v. Budd, 21 Md. 477 (1863).
Acts, 1786, Ch. 45.
Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 341; Ibid, Art. 21, Sec. 92.
40 Md. Code Supp., Art. 53, See. 18; Acts, 1935, Ch. 206.
,1 Md. Code, Art. 45, Sec. 7.
12 Md. Code, Art. 45, See. 6.
2a Md. Code, Art. 45, See. 13.
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Estate pur autre vie. These estates most frequently
arise from a sale of a life estate by the tenant, but may
be also created directly; as a conveyance to A for the life
of B. In such a case, the owner is tenant pur autre vie, and
the person during whose life the estate endures is the cestui
que vie.48 Where the tenant pur autre vie died before the
cestui que vie, the residue of the estate from the death of
the tenant to the death of the cestui que vie did not go to
the tenant's heirs, it not being an estate of inheritance, nor
to his personal representatives, since it was not, at com-
mon law, personal property. The estate being then with-
out an owner, any one might take possession of it, and such
person was known as a general occupant. But in the spe-
cial case, where an estate pur autre vie was conveyed to any
one and his heirs, the heirs, on the death of the tenant, were
entitled to take possession as special occupants. Today in
Maryland, general occupancy has been abolished, but spe-
cial occupancy remains as at common law. Estates for the
life of another person or persons, except those granted to
the deceased and his heirs only are now deemed to be assets
in the hands of the personal representative of the deceased
tenant."
Execution Sale. Sale of land under execution at com-
mon law was impossible because of feudal tenure. This
was superseded by sale under elegit in certain colonies, in-
cluding Maryland, by the Statute of 5 Geo. II, C. 7. The
present power of sheriffs to sell under writs of execution
(fieri facias) is derived from a statute of 1810.4a
Executors and Administrators. By Act of 1798" title
to decedent's leasehold chattels real passes to the adminis-
trator for the purpose of distribution after the payment of
debts and by Act of 191446 a record title deed of such evi-
dence of transmission is required to be given parties en-
titled thereto by executors and administrators upon order
of the Orphans' Court.
Under the common law executors and administrators
had unlimited power of sale over chattels real. But by
Act of 184347 if any administrator or executor shall sell or
remove any property without an order of the Orphans'
Court, the Orphans' Court may revoke his letters and ap-
point a successor to recover the property, and any sale so
41 Venable, Real Property, 16.
"Md. Code, Art. 93, See. 231.
"a Md. Code, Art. 83, See. 1.
4Ibid.
46 Md. Code, Art. 93, See. 84.
"' Md. Code, Art. 93, See. 294.
244
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made without previous authorization of the Orphans' Court
shall be void."' And in Baltimore City, whenever a per-
sonal representative shall make any sale of personal prop-
erty, either by express power granted in the will, or by
virtue of an order of the Orphans' Court, an account of the
sale must be returned to the Court upon oath.49 Where a
sale has been made by an executor under a supposed author-
ity derived from a will, the court may, at its discretion, con-
firm such sale, after hearing the parties interested." Where
a sale of real or personal property is necessary for the
satisfaction of decedent's debts, or for some other purpose,
a court of equity, upon the petition of any person inter-
ested in such sale, may appoint a trustee to sell and convey
the same.51 The power of the Orphans' Court to appoint
trustees to effect the sale of property for the satisfaction
of debts, is confined to realty of intestates, and then only
when such property does not exceed in its appraised value
the sum of $2,500.52
Fraud of Creditors. Conveyances made by a grantor
with intent to defraud his creditors and with the corre-
sponding element of knowledge on the part of the grantee,
can be set aside as void under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth,
ch. 5, as supplemented by the Statute of 27 Elizabeth, ch.
4 and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, even though
the grantee parted with a fair consideration." However,
where a fraudulent conveyance has been made but the gran-
tee has acted in a bona fide manner, in addition to giving
a fair consideration, his (the grantee's) title cannot be
upset.
Joint Tenancy. At common. law a conveyance to two
or more persons not occupying the relation of husband and
wife created a joint tenancy when the four unities of time,
title, interest and possession were present. Since 1882 a
conveyance to such persons creates a tenancy in common5 4
unless it is expressly provided that the property conveyed
is to be held in joint tenancy.5 But this provision has no
" Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 293.
"Rule No. 3 of the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City, approved November
30, 1867.
50 Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 96.
51 Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 97.
82 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 302.
58 Md. Code, Art. 39B, Sec. 7. The English statutes relating to fraudu-
lent conveyances are in effect in Maryland and may be found in I Alex-
ander, British Statutes, 499, and II, Ibid, 555.
5, Fladung v. Rose, 58 Md. 13 (1881).
51 Md. Code, Art. 50, Sec. 13; Wolf v. Johnson, 157 Md. 112, 145 AtI. 3863(1929).
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application to conveyances made to trustees for the benefit
of third parties, such trustees taking a joint tenancy with
the right of survivorship.5 6  Where there is an express cre-
ation of a joint tenancy between husband and wife the in-
terest of either can be reached during their respective lives
in satisfaction of their individual debts.oa A conveyance to
husband and wife has the effect of creating a tenancy by
the entireties unless there is an express provision for some
other type of tenancy.
Kindred of the half blood. At common law the rule was
that to inherit, one must have been of the whole and not of
the half blood. Collateral kinsmen must have descended
not only from the person, but from a marriage with that
person. This strict rule likewise has been changed, and
now there is no distinction between the whole and the half
blood.57
Lapse Statutes. By a statute passed in 18328, it was
provided that no devise, legacy or bequest should fail of
taking effect by reason of the death of any devisee or lega-
tee in the lifetime of the testator, but the devise or bequest
to such deceased legatee or devisee shall have the same
effect as if such legatee or devisee had survived the testa-
tor. By an amendment to this act in 1929, it was extended
to include situations where a member of a class has prede-
ceased the testator.5 9
Leases (ground rents). Leases for 99 years, renewable
forever, have by various acts of the General Assembly, be-
ginning in 1884, been made redeemable by the tenant. The
first of such acts was passed in 1884 and provided that
leases or sub-leases of land for a longer period than 15
years could be redeemed at any time after the expiration of
15 years, at the option of the tenant, at a sum equal to the
capitalization of the rent reserved at the rate of six per
cent, unless some other sum not exceeding four per cent
capitalization be specified."0 By Act of 1888 it was pro-
vided that leases for a longer period than 15 years could
be redeemed by the tenant at the expiration of 10 years at
a capitalization not to exceed six per cent. 1  The latest
5 6 Gray v. Lynch, 8 Gill 403, 424 (1849).
s
6
a Cf. Jordan v. Reynolds, 105 Md. 288, 66 Atl. 37 (1907).
57 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 135.
18 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 335.
59 Md. Code Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 335A. The prior act of 1910 modifying
the law of lapses is construed in Livingstone v. Safe Deposit and Trust
Co., 157 Md. 492, 146 Atl. 432 (1929).60 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 94.
61 Ibid.
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act, passed in 1900, provided that such leases could be re-
deemed by the tenant after the expiration of five years,
provided that thirty days notice be given to the landlord
and a sum paid equal to the capitalization of the rent re-
served at a rate not exceeding six per cent.2 By Act of
1922 no leases executed exclusively for business purposes,
or for any purpose other than residential, are redeem-
able by the tenant, provided that the term of such lease, in-
cluding all renewals provided for therein, shall not exceed
ninety-nine years.6 It is provided, however, that if no de-
mand for rent has been made by the landlord for more than
twenty years, such landlord not only forfeits his right
thereafter to claim rent, but suffers the loss of his rever-
sion. 4
Since 1904, unless otherwise stipulated by the terms of
the lease, rent ceases whenever the improvements on the
premises shall become untenantable by reason of fire or
other unavoidable accident. 5 A tenant has the right to
remove fixtures erected by him under one demise or term,
even though he has accepted a new lease of the same prem-
ises without any intermediate surrender of possession. 6
And where the lessee covenants to yield up the premises
in good repair, he will not be obliged to pay for such build-
ings as may be destroyed by fire or otherwise without fault
or negligence on his part, unless there is a written agree-
ment or covenant that he shall be so bound.67
Limitations on land recovery. Early English statutes
altered the conditions of recovery of land, both as to the
person to whom the right was given, and also as to the time
for exercising it. The last British statute in effect in
Maryland is that of James I." This statute was modified
by the Act of 1870 which simplifies the procedure in eject-
ment proceedings.69 Limitations on the recovery of land
are 20 years except for persons resting under disabilities,
although ejectment proceedings for the recovery of rent
must be brought within three years from the date of the ac-
crual of the cause of action. 70
01Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 95. Ibid, Art. 53, Sec. 25 was repealed by Acts,
1929, Ch. 861.
44 Md. Code, Art. 21, See. 99.
6, Md. Code, Art. 53, See. 27.
65 Md. Code, Art. 53, See. 28; Spear v. Baker, 117 Md. 570, 573, 84 At.
67 (1912).60 Md. Code, Art. 53, See. 29.
67 Md. Code, Art. 53, See. 30.
"8 21 Jac. I, Ch. 16; 2 Alexander, British Statutes, 599.
69 Md. Code, Art. 75, See. 76.10 Md. Code, Art. 57, Sec. 1.
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Married Women's Rights. The common law disabilities
of married women in the matter of the execution by. them
of contracts were removed in 1898."' Formerly the husband
could control such execution, and they were invalid without
his joinder. Today his joinder is no longer necessary, not
even in the execution by the wife of deeds of conveyance."
It is further provided that limitations run against her dur-
ing coverture, 73 although before 1894 the rule was other-
wise.74 It would seem that today there are no restrictions
on the rights of a married woman in respect to the acquisi-
tion and disposition of property, whether personal or' real.
She may deed property to her husband, either directly or
through an intermediary ;71 she may convey her property to
him and herself as tenants by the entireties, subject only to
the rights of subsisting creditors who have three years
within which to attack the transfer as being without con-
sideration or for fraud.76 She may relinquish her dower
rights by power of attorney, 7 and may execute such a power
to an agent authorizing him to relinquish her dower right
either by joining her husband in making such a deed, or she
may act solely and without his joinder. The husband like-
wise may waive his interest in the real estate of his wife
by his joint or separate deed or may authorize an attorney
to do the same."'
Although at common law a married woman could not
make a will, by the Act of 1842 7 she was enabled to do so,
with the provision, however, that there be a joinder by the
husband therein and that she undergo a separate examina-
tion apart from him in order to show absence of duress.
These provisions have now been abolished and a wife may
now make a will in like manner as her husband.""
Married women now hold all their property for their
separate use as fully as if they were unmarried. 2 After
1853 it was no longer necessary to interpose a trustee in
order to secure to her the use of her sole and separate
estate.8 " This sole and separate estate of the wife, both
1 Md. Code, Art. 45, See. 5.
12 Md. Code, Art. 45. See. 4.
78 Md. Code, Art. 57, See. 7.
1' Amey v. Cockey, 73 Md. 297, 20 At. 1071 (1890).
'5 Md. Code Supp., Art. 45, Sec. 1.
' Infra, note 121, Md. Code Supp., Art. 45, Sec. 1.
"Md. Code, Art. 45, Sec. 12.
i Ibid.
19 Acts, 1842, Ch. 293; Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 345.
80 Acts, 1929, Ch. 531.
81 Md. Code, Art. 45, Sec. 4.
8 Ibid.
Md. Code, Art. 45, Sec. 3.
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equitable and statutory, is not abolished and the wife may
convey it through a trustee appointed by a Court of Equity,
without the joinder of her husband. 4 Moreover, between
the ages of 18 and 21 years, she may make a deed'of trust of
her real and personal property with the aid of such Court.84a
In accordance with the theory of her personal control of
separate estate, the property of the wife, whether acquired
before or after marriage, is not liable to execution for the
debts of her husband. 5 This exemption from execution is
extended also to include her earnings during coverture and
insurance on the life of her husband, no matter by whom
it is taken out.8" In the matter of procedure in civil suits,
the wife, as platnitff or defendant, occupies no different
position from any other normal and adult litigant, 7 except
that she may not sue her husband in tort.7 a
Modern Conveyancing. During an early period in the
history of the State livery of seisin was required for aliena-
tion in order to comply with the Statute of Frauds. This
livery was effected by the delivery of a symbolic twig, and
in colonial Maryland, occasionally by a candlestick. In 1776
enrollment was declared to be a sufficient substitute for liv-
ery of seisin, and the practice of indenting deeds soon be-
came equivalent to enrollment. Today neither livery of
seisin nor indenting is essential to the validity of any deed. 8
In 1856, the words "bargain and sale" in the granting
clause of deeds superseded, to a large extent, words of en-
feoffment. By usage and practice in this State, the words
"bargain and sale" and "grant" have simplified convey-
ancing and have almost entirely superseded all other modes
thereof.8 " Since 1864, new forms for conveyancing have
been adopted by law"0 and these have greatly shortened and
simplified the long and involved forms previously used.
These forms, though brief and simple, procure with equal
certainty and security, the covenants of general and spe-
cial warranty, and the rest of the covenants usually found
in conveyances of realty. 1 All instruments purporting to
convey interests in land call for attestation with the excep-
"Bishop v. Safe Deposit Co., 170 Md. 615, 185 Atl 335 (1936).
"a Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 1.
83 Md. Code, Art. 45, See. 1.
8a Md. Code, Art. 45, Sec. 8.
81 Md. Code, Art. 45, Sec. 5.
"1a See Note (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 65.
8" Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 24.
0, Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 443 (1839).
"0 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sees. 56, 74-82.
9" Ibid.
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tion of some few exempted by statutes. Thus no attesta-
tion is required on a mortgage of real estate2 nor on a bill
of sale," nor for a mortgage of chattels," nor for a lease,9'
nor for an assignment of a mortgage on real estate,'8 or a
release thereof, 7 nor for the release of a vendor's lien.'8
Hence it is that any of these instruments, if they follow the
above mentioned forms will, if otherwise valid and not
defective, pass title, were in those cases where the statutes
require attestation."
Notices to Quit. No statute has changed the common
law rule that notice, determining the tenancy, was unneces-
sary, either for an estate for one or more years or for an
estate for a fixed period less than a year. The rule is
equally applicable to landlord and tenant whether in the
counties or in Baltimore City."' But now for estates from
year to year, six months notice before the end of the year
must be given by either landlord or tenant in the counties;
in Baltimore City notice in writing must be given ninety
days before the end of the year by the landlord, but only
thirty days by the tenant. In estates at will, immediate
notice is sufficient, either by landlord or tenant, in the coun-
ties; thirty days notice in writing must be given either by
the landlord or tenant in Baltimore City. To determine
estates it sufferance, no notice is necessary in the counties,
though thirty days notice in writing must be given by either
landlord or tenant in Baltimore City. This latter rule
applies also to estates pur autre vie. The above-mentioned
rules, which have reference to the notice necessary to termi-
nate the tenancy, must be distinguished from the statutory
rule °oa requiring one months notice by the landlord if he
wishes to bring an action for possession of the premises
against a tenant holding over after either a definite term or
one at will.
Nullius Filius. At common law, the illegitimate child
could inherit from no one, and only heirs of his body could
inherit from him. Furthermore at common law, the mother
1 Md. Code, Art. 21, See. 64.
18 Md. Code, Art. 21, See. 65.
9" Md. Code, Art. 21, See. 66.
95 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 67.
0 Md. Code, Art. 21, See. 35.
17 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 37.
91 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 30.
19 Carrico v. Bank, 33 Md. 235 (1870). Compare, however, Md. Code.
Art. 21, See. 90, wherein it is stated that no chattel mortgage shall be valid
without the required attestation.
10o Venable, Real Property, 66.
200a Md. Code, Art. 53, See. 1.
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could not inherit from them, nor could the legitimate chil-
dren of the union. This strict ruling has been changed by
the Act of 1825 and now the illegitimate children of any
female and the issue of any such illegitimate children are
capable of taking real or personal property from their
mother through inheritance.'' Since 1868 they are also
able to take real or personal property from each other, or
from the descendants of each other, in like manner as if
born in lawful wedlock, and, in certain instances, the mother
or her relatives will inherit from the illegitimate.' ° Legiti-
mation of illegitimates requires both marriage and acknowl-
edgment of paternity.' The adoption statutes in effect in
Maryland today operate to vest such adopted children with
full rights in their adopted parents' property as if they
were their own lawfully begotten children. 10 4
Patents. Patents to escheated and confiscated lands
may be obtained through application to the State Land
Office. This was made possible by legislation enacted in
1781.105 However, the State cannot grant a patent to land
covered by navigable waters. 06
Posthumous children. Posthumous children of the in-
testate take in the same manner as if they had been born
before the death of the intestate. This extension of the
right to inherit to posthumous children is limited to children
of the intestate, the posthumous children of any other per-
son being excluded from consideration. 107
Powers of Attorney. According to the ancient method
approved in Comb's Case'0 8 a power of attorney read,
"A.B., principal by C.D. his attorney", the attorney or
agent then acknowledging the deed to be the act of his prin-
cipal. Under the present statute of 185609 the recital is of
a deed made by C.D. by virtue of his power of attorney and
signed by C.D. as attorney or agent. And so in the
acknowledgment C.D. acknowledges the deed to be his act.
Corporations now act by attorneys who state in their deed
that they are appointed for the purpose at hand and make
like statement in their acknowledgment. Now by Act of
102 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 139; Ibid, Art. 46, Sec. 7.
103 Ibid.
103 Md. Code, Art. 46, Sec. 6; Scanlon v. Walsbe, 81 Md. 118, 31 AtI. 498
(1895).
1, Md. Code, Art. 16, Sees. 74-79.
1" Acts, 1781, Ch. 20; Md. Code, Art. 54, Secs. 19, 25.106 Md. Code, Art. 54, Sec. 48.101 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 138.
108 9 Coke 76.00 Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 127.
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1908110 the acknowledgment may be made for the corpora-
tion by its president.
Quit Claim Deeds. Although in many states these
deeds take the place of common law releases, they have
never been specifically recognized in Maryland."' A deed
of this nature would pass title to such estate as the grantor
has therein, but there would be no assurance of any title
whatever, nor any of the usual covenants.
Recordation. Recordation is essential to the grant of
any estate or use of land or any lease for a period of more
than seven years."2  Such recordation is to be made by
the clerk of the Superior Court of Baltimore City if the
land lies therein'18 , or if in the county, then by the clerk of
the Circuit Court of the County in which the land lies."'
Although at one time a deed or mortgage could be recorded
after the expiration of six months from the date of its exe-
cution only by a decree of a court of equity,"5 today a deed
may be recorded even after the expiration of the six month
period without an order of court,"' but a mortgage is still
under the old requirements."'
The Rule in Shelley's Case. The fundamental doctrine
of English land law known as the rule in Shelley's Case has
been abolished in Maryland by the Act of 1912.118 The
destruction of this doctrine is, however, inapplicable to in-
struments executed prior to the date on which the act took
effect.
Springing and Shifting Uses. These are governed by
the early English Statute of Uses and not by any Maryland
statute.
Tax Titles. Title to property acquired through pur-
chase at a tax sale is always looked upon with suspicion be-
cause there is no presumption in favor of official acts being
done regularly or full notice having been given to all parties
in interest as required by law."" This suspicion continues
even after the sales have been reported to and ratified by a
110 Ibid.
111 Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md. 530 (1883), construing Md. Code, Art. 21,
Sec. 12. For a full discussion of the use of the word "grant" in deeds and
of the effect of a deed of bargain and sale see Frank, Title to Real and
Personal Property in Maryland, 41, 57-58.112 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 1.
213 Constitution of 1867, Art. IV, Sec. 38. Md. Code, Art. 21, See. 13.
21 Md. Code, Art. 17, Sec. 59.
118 Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 35.
110 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 20.
117 Knell v. Green St. Building Assoc., 34 Md. 72 (1870).
Acts, 1912, Ch. 144; Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 342.
119 Md. Code, Art. 81, Sec. 61.
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Court of Equity. A purchaser at a tax sale must claim the
property within seven years after the ratification of the sale
otherwise title and possession thereto will be barred under
the doctrine of adverse user.120
Tenancies by the Entireties. A tenancy by the entire-
ties is created by a grant to a husband and wife when the
four unities of time, title, interest and possession are pres-
ent. Where a tenancy of this nature has been created, there
is a freedom from the liens of judgment creditors of either
spouse, but not freedom from the lien of a judgment credi-
tor having a judgment against the spouses jointly. It would
seem that this type of tenancy can be created by a grant by
one spouse to the other spouse and the grantor as tenants by
the entireties, without the interposition of a straw man."'
Torrens System. This method of simplification of land
title recordation and transfer has never been adopted in
Maryland.
Words of Inheritance. At common law, in order to cre-
ate a fee simple by deed, the use of the word "heirs" was
necessary. Various other expressions containing the same
import were insufficient. The first qualification of this rule
was made in favor of wills when the inclusion of the word
"heirs" was rendered unnecessary.'22 All that was re-
quired was that a clear intention on the part of the testator
to dispose of his entire estate and thus to create a fee
simple, be shown. The technicality was destroyed in 1856
when it was provided that no words of inheritance were
necessary in order to create a fee simple by a conveyance
by deed. Every conveyance of property inter vivos was
deemed to convey the grantor's entire estate unless a con-
trary intention appeared.'2
Worthier Title. Where a will devises land of the same
quantity and quality to a person who would take the same as
heir at law, such person takes as heir and not as devisee.1 23a
Prospective Future Changes. In 1931, the Commission
to Revise the Land and Inheritance Laws of Maryland,
120 Md. Code, Art. 57, See. 15.
1I Although there is no case stating directly that such a tenancy can be
created without the intervention of a straw man in Maryland, there is
strong language indicating that such a result might be effected. Lang v.
Wilmer, 131 Md. 215, 101 Atl. 706 (1917). See also Md. Code Supp., Art.
50, Sec. 13A, which might conceivably support the creation of a tenancy by
the entireties by a conveyance between the spouses without the aid of a
straw man. In general, see 62 A. L. R. 511 and the authorities there cited.1 22 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 336.
122 Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 11.
118a Posey v. Budd, 21 Md. 477 (1863); Donnelly v. Turner, 60 Md. 81
(1883).
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which had been created by the General Assembly in 1929,124
began its work by procuring changes in the laws affecting
the adlministration of personalty in the Orphans' Court.
The Commission proposes to continue its efforts in this
respect by procuring an entire statutory revision of testa-
mentary law and procedure.
CANCELLATION OF ACCRUED DIVIDENDS ON
PREFERRED STOCK UNDER GENERAL RESER-
VATION IN CHARTER OF POWER TO MAKE
AMENDMENTS CHANGING TERMS OF
OUTSTANDING STOCK
Of especial interest to corporation counsel in recent
years has been the question whether a scheme for capital
adjustment may include the cancellation of accrued divi-
dends on preferred stock. Under the Maryland statute
such a change requires unanimous consent of the holders
of the preferred issue affected unless the charter contains
an appropriate reservation of the amending power.' The
larger Maryland corporations in many, if not most, cases
operate under charters which contain express reservations
of amending power. A typical form of clause is as follows:
"The corporation reserves the right to make any amend-
ment authorized by law, including amendments changing
the terms of outstanding stock, provided that any such
amendment shall require the vote of the holders of two-
thirds of the stock affected thereby."'
This typical situation in Maryland may be contrasted
with the similar one in Delaware. Such reservations are
seldom found in Delaware charters. The reason is that
since 1915 the Delaware law has contained a provision that
an amendment altering or changing the "preferences" of
preferred stock may be made, provided holders of a major-
ity of the stock affected vote in favor of the change.' The
12' Acbs, 1929, Ch. 527.
1 Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 28.
2Frequently the charter, in place of requiring consent of a majority or
two-thirds of the stock affected, merely specifies the vote required by law
for amendments not changing outstanding stock. Such vote is two-thirds
of each class of voting stock. Art. 23, Sec. 29. But under another section
the charter may specify that any action may be taken by a majority of
each class, or by a majority of nll votes to which the shares of all classes
of voting stock are, in the aggregate, entitled. Art. 23, Sec. 23.
' Del. Rev. Code 1915, Sec. 1940; Del. Laws, Vol. 29, Ch. 113, Sec. 12.
